Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office by Lundqvist, Heléne
 IS IT WORTH IT? ON THE RETURNS TO HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICE  
Heléne Lundqvist 
Document de treball de l’IEB 2013/14 
 
 Fiscal Federalism 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2013/14 
IS IT WORTH IT? ON THE RETURNS  
TO HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICE 
 
 
Heléne Lundqvist 
 
 
 
 
The IEB research program in Fiscal Federalism aims at promoting research in the 
public finance issues that arise in decentralized countries. Special emphasis is put on 
applied research and on work that tries to shed light on policy-design issues. Research 
that is particularly policy-relevant from a Spanish perspective is given special 
consideration. Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of 
the program. The program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation and the IEB-
UB Chair in Fiscal Federalism funded by Fundación ICO, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
and Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics. 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 
Diputació de Barcelona, Gas Natural and La Caixa) support several research programs. 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here 
are those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2013/14 
IS IT WORTH IT? ON THE RETURNS  
TO HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICE * 
 
 
Heléne Lundqvist 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  Despite the key role played by political payoffs in theory, very little is 
known empirically about the types of payoffs that motivate politicians. The purpose of this 
paper is to bring some light into this. I estimate causal effects of being elected in a local 
election on monetary returns. The claim for causality, I argue, can be made thanks to a 
research design where the income of some candidate who just barely won a seat is 
compared to that of some other candidate who was close to winning a seat for the same 
party, but ultimately did not. This research design is made possible thanks to a 
comprehensive, detailed data set covering all Swedish politicians who have run for office in 
the period 1991{2006. I establish that monetary returns are absent both in the short and 
long run. In stead, politicians seem to be motivated by non-monetary returns, and I show 
that being elected locally once (for exogenous reasons) can be an effective starting point for 
enjoying such payoffs. 
 
 
JEL Codes: C23, D72, J44 
Keywords:  Returns to politics, political career concerns, regression discontinuity design 
 
 
Heléne Lundqvist 
Department of Economics 
Stockholm University 
SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden 
Email: helene.lundqvist@ne.su.se 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 I thank Philippe Aghion, Matz Dahlberg, Per-Anders Edin, Olle Folke, Mikael Lindahl, Eva Mörk, Torsten Persson, 
Erik Plug, Michael Smart, David Strömberg, Björn Öckert, Robert Östling, participants at the IV Workshop on Fiscal 
Federalism held in Barcelona June/July 2011 and the 2nd National Conference of Swedish Economist held in 
Uppsala September 2011, seminar participants at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance and at the 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) and brown-bag participants at the IIES and at the Department of 
Economics at Uppsala University for helpful discussions, suggestions and comments. Financial support from 
Handelsbanken's Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Introduction
Politics is just like any economic activity; for it to be worthwhile, the benefits
must outweigh the costs. This notion is prevalent in close to all political
economy models from Downs (1957), where a politician is “some agent”
whose main objective is to maximize votes and win elections in order to
reap some (unspecified) benefits from being in office, to the more modern
citizen-candidate models (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski,
1996), where the benefits explicitly include the possibility of implementing
some desired policy. Despite its key theoretical role, empirical evidence of
what types of payoffs that motivate politicians is more or less a black box.
The purpose of this paper is to bring some light into this.
To this aim, I first look at monetary returns from politics by estimating
causal effects of being elected in a local election on income shortly after
being elected as well as up to 15 years later. This is made possible thanks
to a newly collected extensive data set covering all Swedish politicians who
have run for office at any level (local, regional or national) in the period
1991–2006.1
To get a first idea of what these monetary returns could be, Figure 1 dis-
plays the income profiles for all candidates who ran for a municipal council in
the 1998 election, separately by whether or not they were elected. Although
those elected clearly have higher income than those who were not, the gap is
almost as large before the election as after. These differences can potentially
be the result of selection—i.e., that elected candidates would have earned
more than non-elected candidates even in the absence of being elected—as
well as of different political histories—i.e., that elected candidates in 1998
are more likely to have been elected also in previous elections. While it is
possible to partly control for these and other confounding factors, the figure
illustrates quite well the difficulty in identifying the causal effect of being
elected.
Instead, the claim for causality in this paper, I argue, can be made
thanks to a simple yet compelling research design which, to my knowledge,
has never before been applied. It fits into the class of identification strate-
gies that rely on stochastic features of close elections (e.g., Lee et al., 2004
and Folke, 2011), but differs in that identification comes from within-party
discontinuities rather than between. The idea is to compare the income of
some candidate who just barely won a seat to that of some other candi-
date who was close to winning a seat for the same party , but ultimately did
not. Because elections result in a fixed final ranking of each party’s candi-
1The majority of local politicians in Sweden hold regular jobs and, at least partly,
devote their spare time to politics. This means that monetary returns from politics can
stem both directly from official perquisites and remuneration as well as from a better paid
private job, even in the short run.
Figure 1: Disposable income among candidates running for a municipal
council in 1998
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Note: The figure plots average disposable income among candidates who were elected into a
municipal council in 1998 and among candidates running for a municipal council in 1998 without
getting elected. Income is measured in logs of 100 SEK deflated to 2000 year values.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
dates,2 the discontinuity between these candidates—whom I refer to as the
borderline elected and borderline defeated —is well-defined. Moreover, other
candidates than these two can be used to detect and control for any possible
direct effects of being more highly ranked on income.3
Applying this identification strategy, I show graphically and economet-
rically that monetary returns from politics are absent irrespective if one
considers the period right after the election, up to 15 years later or the
period right after exiting politics. This result holds for different income
measures such as disposable income, total labor income or labor income
from the largest source. It is also true on average as well as when consider-
ing heterogeneous effects across various dimensions of parties, councils and
candidates.
Thus, given that there are no positive monetary returns, politicians are
likely not motivated by such returns. Rather, it seems that there must
be some non-monetary returns that politicians pursue. These can, for ex-
ample, be political accomplishments, a sense of actively taking part in the
2Which to a large extent corresponds to the party’s own ballot paper rankings of
candidates; see Section 3.1.
3As already noted, the identification strategy is clearly related to the regression dis-
continuity designs that rely on discontinuities in vote shares and focus on elections where
some party won with a small margin. Instead, I rely on the discontinuity in candidate
ranks induced by the fact that each party will assign only as many seats as were won
in the election. To check the robustness of the results I can, however, also use the more
traditional vote share discontinuities generated by the seat assignments between parties
by only focusing on the borderline elected and defeated in those parties that were close to
winning/losing an extra seat.
community, the desire to affect society in a certain direction, prestige and
power—things that are hard if not impossible to measure. However, such
non-monetary returns are to a large extent encompassed by candidates’ po-
litical careers. Therefore, I proceed to investigate if being elected locally
improves future political career prospects.
As a motivation for this, consider the stylized picture in Figure 2 showing
the percentages among all elected and all non-elected candidates from the
1998 municipal council elections that went on to national politics in the 2002
and/or the 2006 election. The figure shows that locally elected politicians
are 3.5 times more likely to be nominated for parliament (left bars) and,
conditional on being nominated, 2.5 times more likely to actually be elected
(right bars). Now, a causal interpretation of this picture is, of course, as
problematic as the income comparison between elected and non-elected can-
didates in Figure 1. For evidence of how being elected locally for exogenous
reasons affects political careers, I therefore apply the same identification
strategy as for income and compare the borderline elected and the border-
line defeated with respect to their future probabilities of being nominated
for parliament as well as their future probabilities of being elected in local
elections.4
Figure 2: Percentages among municipal council candidates in 1998 nomi-
nated for and elected into the national parliament in 2002 and/or 2006
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Note: The figure shows the percentage that was nominated for and elected into the national
parliament in the 2002 and/or 2006 election among candidates who were elected into a municipal
council in 1998 and among candidates who ran for a municipal council in 1998 but did not get
elected.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that being borderline elected
into a municipal council improves political career prospects, especially through
4Note that because the national parliament only has 349 seats, getting elected is a
very rare event. For this reason, the analysis on advancing nationally will be restricted to
nominations.
increased chances of advancing to national politics, but also of being elected
in future local elections—at least in the short run. Hence, if the goal of
politicians is to enjoy non-monetary payoffs such as political accomplish-
ments, prestige and power from a successful political career, being elected
once locally is an effective starting point.
The method in the paper is applicable thanks to high-quality data. Lack
of proper data is probably the main reason why there is very scant causal
evidence of what the returns to politics are. However, one recent study
by Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) has overcome the data limitations by
collecting estates of deceased members of the British House of Commons.
This data together with their empirical approach make this the perhaps
most credible study so far. They estimate the effect on wealth (at the time
of death) of being elected into parliament using a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) where they compare candidates who won/lost with narrow
vote margins—a research design similar to that in this paper. The resulting
estimates point to substantial wealth effects for Conservative members of
parliament but no effects for Labour members.5
With an entirely different approach, Diermeier et al. (2005) also aim at
quantifying the returns to holding political office. They formulate a com-
prehensive dynamic structural model of career decisions of politicians, and
test the model with data on US congressmen that includes pre-election char-
acteristics as well as post-congressional employment information. However,
a problem is that their data is restricted to actual congressmen, implying
that the results can only be interpreted conditional on being elected . In a
sample selection-correction model a` la Heckman (1979) with local, regional
and national trends in the Democratic/Republican support as an exclusion
restriction, they estimate that being re -elected once has a positive effect
on post-congressional earnings, but that the positive effect vanishes rather
quickly with additional experience. Another interesting finding is that non-
pecuniary returns from policy accomplishments and realized political ambi-
tion are seemingly large.
This paper provides new evidence on what types of returns that motivate
politicians in two main ways. First, it is the only study to focus on the
local rather than the national political arena. I argue that local politics
is the relevant context for studying politicians’ motivations, since this is
where most political careers start off. For example, among the 349 members
of the Swedish parliament in 2006, 75% had previously held a municipal
council seat during at least one election period. Furthermore, local politics
deals with issues affecting the everyday life of citizens, making its actors an
important group to study.
Second, unlike Great Britain and the US, Swedish politics is character-
ized by a typical multi-party, proportional representation system with less
5Aside from RDD they also use a matching framework, and the results are the same.
focus on the individual candidate and more on the party as such. With such
differences in political institutions it is essential to explore whether also the
returns to politics differ—and if so, to perhaps start thinking about the
consequences for who decides to become a politician.
Another merit of the paper is its high-quality data. It covers all can-
didates who have run for office at any level (local, regional or national) in
any of the five elections held during the period 1991–2006. Two crucially
important features are, first, that it contains the same information on all
candidates irrespective of whether or not they were elected. Second, for most
of the elections, it contains sufficiently detailed information to reproduce the
final ranking of candidates resulting from the election, which makes it pos-
sible to determine who is the borderline elected. These two features, alone,
make the data unique in its kind. Furthermore, rich register-based infor-
mation on characteristics such as age, sex, foreign background, educational
attainment, labor market status, occupation and various income measures
is matched to all these candidates using a unique person identifier. The reg-
isters are in annual form and cover the years 1990–2006 for all candidates,
which makes it possible to (i) follow candidates over a long time period; (ii)
verify the identifying assumption with many pre-determined candidate char-
acteristics; and (iii) study heterogeneous treatment effects across candidate
characteristics.
Evidence of the types of payoffs that motivate politicians is an important
piece to understanding the wider scheme of how politics work. The natural
follow-up questions are then if payoffs matter for the selection of politicians
and, ultimately, if the selection of politicians matters for policy. Above, I
discussed studies that, like the present study, focus on the question of what
the payoffs are. In the next section, I review the existing research on these
other two related aspects. After that brief literature review, the paper is
structured as follows: Section 3 describes the key features of local politics in
Sweden and the procedure for ranking candidates within parties. Section 4
states the general assumptions for identifying the effect of being elected, as
well as some additional parametric assumptions needed for estimation and
inference. The data is described in Section 5 along with a motivation of
the choice of outcome variables. Section 6 discusses what the treatment—
being elected into a municipal council vs. being close to being elected—is
likely to capture. In terms of main results, monetary returns constitute the
focus in Section 7 and political careers in Section 8. Preceding the final and
concluding section, Section 9 provides a discussion of the heterogeneity and
external validity of the results.
2 Related literature
In his discussion of recent developments in political economics, Merlo (2006)
recognizes the following two questions as important (p. 26): (i) Who chooses
to become a politician? (ii) What are the payoffs from becoming a politician?
Like Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) and Diermeier et al. (2005) that were
discussed in the introduction, this paper focuses on the second question. To
put things in perspective, below I briefly go over the evidence on the first
question regarding the selection of politicians.6
Theoretical models of the selection effect of rewards reach different con-
clusions (Besley, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008;
Messner and Polborn, 2004).7 On the empirical part, two studies with sim-
ilar focus yield the same results: Ferraz and Finan (2009) and Gagliarducci
and Nannicini (2011) both estimate positive effects of increased wages on
performance and selection—the former for local politicians in Brazil and
the latter for Italian mayors. For Finland, Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2010)
find that a policy-induced salary increase among members of parliament
raised the average level of education among female candidates but not among
males. Finally, Keane and Merlo (2010) use the framework and data from
Diermeier et al. (2005) to simulate a variety of policy changes and study
whether the effects are disproportionate across different types of politicians.
Their model has two dimensions of ability: (i) “skill”, defined as the ability
to win elections; and (ii) “desire for legislative accomplishment”. According
to their simulations, congressional wage decreases induce politicians with
high ability of type one to exit congress relatively more quickly, but do not
affect politicians with high ability of type two.
3 Swedish local politics
This section provides an overview of key features of Swedish local politics
and municipal elections. There are 290 municipalities in total, which are re-
sponsible for a range of public sector goods and services, including primary
and secondary education, child care and care for the elderly. Each munic-
ipality is governed by a municipal council elected every fourth year (every
third year before 1994) in proportional elections held on the same day as
elections to the national parliament and the county councils. Voter turnout
is high from an international perspective; usually around 80%.
Around two thirds are single-constituency municipalities, but munici-
palities with a larger electorate have multiple constituencies. In the case
6The natural follow-up questions are then whether politicians’ types and characteristics
matter for their voting decisions (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Washington, 2008), resulting
policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003; Svaleryd, 2009) and, ultimately,
for economic outcomes such as growth (Besley et al., 2011; Jones and Olken, 2005).
7See also Besley (2005) on how political selection is affected by institutions in general.
of two constituencies or more, candidates are elected separately from each
constituency. The municipal council decides on the total number of council
seats, subject to minimum restrictions set by the Municipal Law ranging
between 31 for municipalities with up to 12,000 eligible voters to 101 for
the municipality of Stockholm. The median council size is 41. Seats are
distributed between parties based on vote shares via the so-called “modified
odd-number method”, and there is no formal vote threshold for a seat.8 All
seven major parties in the national parliament (eight after the 2010 election)
operate and have separate organizations at the national, regional and local
level.9 In some municipalities, there are additional local parties.
The municipal council is the highest decision-making body in the mu-
nicipality and its tasks are regulated in the Municipal Law; it must appoint
members and replacements for committees, the most important of which is
the executive board10 (i.e., the “government” of the municipality); it must
decide on issues that are of first-order relevance to the municipality such as
the budget, the rate of the proportional income tax, organizational forms
for the executive branch, remunerations to elected representatives and lo-
cal referenda; it can delegate decisions on issues that are of second-order
relevance to the executive board and to working committees.
Hence, the power of the council as stated in the Municipal Law is quite
high. However, a parliamentary report with the purpose of considering mea-
sures for improving local democracy suggested, among other things, that the
council’s power over the agenda and its overall participation in preparations
and decisions of political decisions be increased (Swedish Ministry of Integra-
tion and Equality, 2001). This suggestion was motivated by an increasing
trend in delegations of decisions to the executive board and to the chair-
manships of major working committees, and a more pronounced view of the
council as merely being a formal decision-making institution on issues that
have in practice been settled much earlier in the political process.
Part of the explanation for the more widespread delegations is the fact
that the majority of local politicians have other occupations and devote their
spare time to politics—less than 3% of all elected representatives (O¨hrvall,
2004; O¨hrvall and Persson, 2008) and around 8% of the politicians elected
into the council (own data) receive full-time or part-time compensation.11
8These and other regulations surrounding elections are mainly stipulated in the Mu-
nicipal Law and the Elections Act.
9Since the founding of the Green Party in 1981, national politics has been dominated
by seven parties; besides the Green, there is the Left Party, the Social Democrats, the
Center Party, the Liberal Party, the Moderate Party and the Christian Democratic Party.
In the 1991 election, the populist party the New Democrats made a short appearance, and
in the 2010 election the right-wing extremist party the Sweden Democrats—which had so
far only been locally successful–entered the national parliament.
10The executive board is appointed such that the resulting distribution of seats between
parties mirrors the seat distribution in the council.
11At least 40 but less than 100% of full-time pay are classified as part-time, although this
According to a survey of local politicians conducted in 1999, the hours per
week devoted to politics are 17.8 among chairs, 8.3 among regular council
members and 5.3 among council replacements (Hagevi, 2000). But even
though this system implies that time constraints can be significant obstacles,
it is generally viewed as desirable because it also has the benefit of sustaining
close connections between politicians and voters.
Section 6 returns to the question of what being elected into a municipal
council really entails. Now, however, follows a description of the process of
actually getting there, which forms the basis for the identification strategy
of the paper.
3.1 Assignment of seats within parties
Candidates can only be elected to the municipal council via parties. Parties
running for election nominate and subsequently rank candidates on ballot
papers, somewhat generalized, according to the following procedure (Ba¨ck
and Mo¨ller, 2003):
1. All party members can nominate candidates. At this stage, special-
interest politics plays a role in that youth organizations, women’s or-
ganizations, unions etc. nominate their preferred candidates. Anyone
who has the right to vote in the municipal election can be nominated
for their municipality’s council.12
2. An appointed election committee ranks the nominated candidates who
have agreed to run. Naturally, overall popularity plays a role in the
ranking but also representativity in terms of gender, age, experience
and political standpoints. Some parties hold internal trial elections to
assist in the ranking.
3. The ballot paper rankings are fixed. This normally occurs around six
months before the election.
A party can run with several ballot papers in a single constituency and/or
with one ballot paper in several constituencies, meaning that there can be
several bal lot paper rankings in a single constituency and/or one bal lot paper
ranking for several constituencies. Because the seats are assigned separately
for each constituency, there is, however, always one single final ranking per
constituency. Given the total number of seats that each party has won in the
constituency, it is according to this final ranking that seats are distributed
within parties.
is a rough classification since it is not always clear what constitutes a full-time assignment.
12There are some minor exceptions to this rule, such as municipal employees in charge
of personnel (Municipal Law 4 Ch. 6§).
Starting with the 1998 election, voters can mark one preferred candidate
on the ballot paper (so-called preference voting). When determining the final
ranking, the top is set based on the ranking of such preference votes. The
threshold for being elected via preference votes is 5% of the party’s votes in
the constituency, though this must be at least 50 votes. For candidates who
do not reach this threshold, so-called comparison numbers are calculated,
which are then ranked.
How the ballot paper ranking translates into the final ranking can be a
complicated matter, for example when there are multiple ballot papers per
constituency or when candidates run in several constituencies. These com-
plications only arise in a minority of cases, and the details of the procedure
are described in the Appendix. For the majority of cases, however, the final
ranking mirrors the ballot paper ranking, except that candidates who have
reached the preference vote threshold are put at the top.13 The following
section describes how the final candidate ranking is used for identification
of the effect of being elected into a municipal council.
4 Identification strategy
The potential outcome framework introduced by Rubin (1974, 1990) is use-
ful for conceptually thinking about identification of the effect of being an
elected politician on some outcome Y . Let Yi(1) be the potential outcome
of individual i if being treated (i.e., being elected to the municipal council),
and Yi(0) the potential outcome of the same individual if not treated. The
difference between the two potential outcomes, Yi(1) − Yi(0), is then the
treatment effect. While this definition of a treatment effect is intuitive, it
is fundamentally impossible to measure. The reason—i.e., the identification
problem—is that Yi(1) and Yi(0) are both potential outcomes of which only
one can be observed.
Consider the outcome disposable income. Assume that we observe Yi(1)—
that is, we observe the disposable income of an elected politician.14 The
challenge in determining the treatment effect is then to find the best coun-
terfactual outcome, meaning that one should look for the income that this
individual would have earned, had he not been elected. A number of pos-
sible counterfactuals can be considered. First, it is possible to exploit time
variation and compare the income of the same individual before and after
13In the three elections since the introduction of the preference vote covered by the
data, around 15–20% of the candidates reached this threshold. However, considerably
fewer were elected because of their preference votes, as the majority of those who reached
the threshold were also sufficiently highly ranked on their party’s ballot paper. Thus,
the difference between the ballot paper ranking and the final ranking induced by moving
candidates elected via preference votes to the top is, in practice, very small.
14I abstract from time indices here but, as will soon be clear, outcomes will be measured
in three different periods from the time of election.
he was elected. However, this will fail to identify the treatment effect if
other things affecting his income changed during this period besides be-
coming elected (either directly for the politician or indirectly due to some
aggregate shock), an event that seems highly plausible. Second, one could
exploit cross-sectional variation and compare the income of the politician
with that of other individuals at the same point in time. Unfortunately, this
will most likely bias the estimated treatment effect even more, because the
politician and “other individuals” differ along numerous other dimensions
of which some are likely to be correlated with income.
Ideally, one would like the treatment of being elected into a municipal
council to be random, since randomization ensures zero correlation with any
outcome. And as elections have stochastic features, for some politicians it is
indeed a matter of chance whether or not they are elected. Thus generally,
under the assumption that election outcomes cannot be perfectly controlled,
close elections induce random variation in who does and who does not get
elected.15
Specifically, I will use the variation in treatment status between candi-
dates running for the same party, given the number of seats won by that
party. The idea is to reproduce the final ranking of candidates, as laid out
in Section 3.1 and the Appendix, of a party that won n seats in some con-
stituency and then compare the outcome (income, say) of the treated nth
candidate to that of the untreated (n + 1)th candidate. Because the nth
ranked candidate just barely got elected by being assigned his party’s last
seat and the (n+ 1)th ranked candidate was close to being elected but was
ultimately not, in what follows I refer to the former as the borderline elected
and to the latter as the borderline defeated .
It is possible that the final ranking is systematically related to the out-
come of interest. Or, put differently, it is possible and even likely that there
is a systematic difference between the innate “quality” of the borderline
elected and the borderline defeated. Other candidates than the borderline
elected and defeated can help detect such direct effects. To this aim, vi-
sual inspection of the data is particularly illustrative; the treatment effect
will be seen graphically as the difference between the borderline elected and
defeated that is above and beyond differences between any other two candi-
dates.
Technically, the identification strategy is a regression discontinuity de-
sign (RDD) where the forcing variable is the difference between a candi-
date’s (final) rank and the (final) rank of the borderline elected, rank?.16
15Following Lee et al. (2004), this idea has been exploited in numerous papers estimating
“party effects”.
16The first application using RDD was Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), which, like
in this paper, was based on a discrete forcing variable. Since the formal conditions for
identification in the continuous case were derived by Hahn et al. (2001), the applications
in economics have been numerous (see Lee and Lemieux (2010)).
The identifying assumption is that parties cannot perfectly anticipate how
many seats they will win and thereby rank their candidates accordingly.17
That is, parties cannot be absolutely certain which n candidates will be
elected so that the quality of the (n + 1)th candidate is irrelevant. Rather,
the direct effect of rank on the outcome must be smooth for ranks around
the borderline elected.
Because the forcing variable is discrete, assuming some parametric func-
tional form is necessary in order to estimate the magnitude and standard
error of the treatment effect. This is different from an RDD with a continu-
ous forcing variable, which allows for non-parametric identification if there
is a sufficiently large number of data points “infinitely close” to the discon-
tinuity point. Lee and Card (2008) discuss identification and inference in
RDD in the discrete case. They show that when the assumed parametric
form differs from the true parametric form by some error that is identical
irrespective of treatment status, the treatment effect is still identified, al-
though the confidence intervals need to be inflated. Inflating the confidence
intervals is then done by clustering at the level of the discrete values of
the forcing variable. However, this procedure is not feasible in this applica-
tion, because the forcing variable, rank?, can only take a limited number of
values.
Instead, underlying the preferred regression specification will be the
parametric assumption that the direct effect of rank? is linear for a lim-
ited sample consisting of the nth, (n+ 1)th and (n+ 2)th ranked candidates.
I refer to such a set of candidates per party and constituency as the bor-
derline group .18 By limiting the estimation sample to three candidates per
borderline group, the error from assuming linearity is likely to be smaller.
The regression to be estimated on the sample of candidates ranked nth–
(n+ 2)th is then:19
Yi,g,t+j = β0 + β1electedi,g,t + β2rank
?
i,g,t (+  
′
X i,g,t−1) + εi,g,t+j , (1)
where Yi,g,t+j is the outcome for candidate i in borderline group g running
in election year t, j periods ahead. The forcing variable rank∗i,g,t—the dif-
ference between the rank of candidate i in group g and the rank of the
17Recall from above that the ballot paper rankings are normally set around six months
before the election, implying that this is not a very strong assumption.
18The reason for including the (n+2)th rather than the (n−1)th candidate is to have the
sample as representative as possible. In the latter case, the sample needs to be restricted
to parties where at least two candidates were elected via comparison numbers. Now,
instead, the only restriction is that there is at least one candidate elected via comparison
numbers. This is explained in more detail in the Appendix.
19For the continuous income outcomes, the estimated model will be a log-linear. For
the binary future election outcomes, a linear probability model will be estimated.
borderline elected in group g—is defined such that it equals 0 for the bor-
derline elected and −1 and −2 for the candidates who would have been
elected had the party gained one or two more seats, respectively. The term
in parenthesis represents effects of a vector of individual characteristics mea-
sured one year prior to the election that will be controlled for in most of
the estimations and the graphical counterparts (although they should be
redundant for identification purposes). Finally, εi,g,t+j is an error term that
is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated within municipality.20
Both the graphical analysis and the estimations of equation (1) will con-
sider short-, medium- and long-run outcomes, which for income outcomes
translate into the time index t+j being the average over 1–3, 6–8 and 13–15
years after election t, respectively. For short-, medium- and long-run elec-
tion outcomes, t+ j will be the first, second and fourth subsequent election,
respectively.21
The treatment parameter of interest is β1 and the condition for the causal
effect to be identified in equation (1) is that the direct effect of rank relative
to the borderline elected is captured by β2, meaning, once more, that it must
be (at most) of order one for candidates ranked nth–(n+ 2)th.
More than three candidates per borderline group (i.e., per party and
constituency)22 are required for the treatment effect to be identified if the
direct effect of rank? is of higher order than one.23 As a complement to
the main specification in (1), a set of results from running the following
regression on the borderline elected and several defeated candidates will
therefore also be presented:
Yi,g,t+j = β0 + β1electedi,g,t +
p¯∑
p=1
β2p(rank
?
i,g,t)
p + εi,g,t+j , (2)
where the term summing over order of polynomial p represents the direct
effect of rank? and p¯ is the highest order of polynomial included in the
regression. Several versions of equation (2) will be estimated by varying p¯
between 1 and 3 and the number of defeated candidates included (i.e, the
bandwidth) between 5 and 10.
20This variance-covariance matrix may seem too restrictive. However, it turns out that
clustering the standard errors at smaller units than municipality—as is done now—does,
in fact, not improve the precision of the estimates (the results are available upon request).
21Four elections ahead is as far as the data allows the analysis to go. The reason for not
studying the third subsequent outcome is simply to keep the number of outcomes down.
22The majority of borderline groups are at the constituency level. However, when a
ballot paper overlaps several constituencies, the group is at the municipality level; see the
Appendix.
23Analogously, a simple mean comparison of the borderline elected and defeated iden-
tifies the treatment effect if there is no direct effect of rank?.
With the empirical setup represented by equations (1) and (2), con-
trolling for group-specific characteristics or a group fixed-effect (or some
other more aggregate fixed-effect) is, for identification purposes, more or
less redundant. To see this, note that the estimation samples consist of a
nearly-balanced panel with borderline groups of candidates with the same
rank? values. The only exceptions are those groups where there are too few
defeated candidates so that it is not possible to assign low values of rank?
to anyone (cf. Figure 10 in the Appendix). Therefore, unless these excep-
tions are systematic, any group characteristics must be uncorrelated with
rank∗i,g,t and hence, also with the treatment variable electedi,g,t since this is
simply an indicator variable 1(rank∗i,g,t = 0).
24
The identifying assumption that parties cannot perfectly anticipate which
candidates that will be elected may be more likely to hold for some groups
than for others. Specifically, parties that have repeatedly won n seats may
anticipate that they will do so also in the next election and, consequently,
may not care about the quality of the (n+ 1)th candidate. Figure 3 assesses
whether this is likely to be a problem. Separately by party size, it shows
the variability of seats for a given party in a given council over elections
1985–2002, measured as the deviation in the number of seats in a particular
election from the mean number of seats over the entire period.
Reassuringly, Figure 3 shows substantial variation even for parties that
on average have two seats or less (top left plot).25 To further investigate the
validity of the identifying assumption, the empirical analysis will contain
robustness checks where I mimic a group-specific unanticipated shock that
affects who the borderline elected is. Specifically, the estimation sample will
be restricted to only include (i) groups whose total number of seats changed
from the previous election; (ii) groups that won their nth seat or lost their
(n+1)th seat with narrow vote margins; and (iii) the combination of (i) and
(ii). For this exercise, the definition and calculation of minimum changes in
votes to win or lose an additional seat in proportional elections as developed
by Folke (2011)26 will be used.
Moreover, to strengthen the notion that β1 really captures the effect
of being elected, placebo regressions in which each group is assigned one
or two additional seats so that the (n + 1)th or the (n + 2)th candidate is
the “borderline elected” will be estimated. These estimations will serve as
complements to the graphical analysis where such placebo effects can be
24One may still want to include group fixed-effects to increase the precision of the
estimates. However, it turns out that doing this neither affects the point estimates nor
the standard errors (the results are available upon request).
25As should be clear from Section 3.1, there is a considerable amount of internal democ-
racy within the parties in setting the ranking, suggesting that the quality of the (border-
line) defeated candidates matters even when there is little uncertainty about how many
seats the party will win.
26I sincerely thank him for generously sharing his STATA code.
Figure 3: Variability in parties’ number of seats
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Note: The figures show the distribution of the deviation in the number of seats in a particular
election between 1985 and 2002 from the mean number of seats over the entire period, seats.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
directly detected.
5 Data
Detailed data over political candidates is a necessity for applying the above
described research design. The data used in this paper, obtained from Statis-
tics Sweden and The Swedish Election Authority, covers all candidates who
have run for office to a Swedish municipal council or to the national parlia-
ment in any of the five elections held during the period 1991–2006.27 The
elections to municipal councils in 1991, 1998 and 2002/in 1991 and 1998/in
1991 define the population under study for short-/medium-/long-run out-
comes. The number of borderline groups is around 1800–1900 in each of
these three elections. Data from the 1994 election is of poorer quality and
could not be used to define borderline groups. However, data from all elec-
tions between 1994 and 2006 will be used for outcome purposes (see below
for details), and the 2006 data additionally contains some useful informa-
tion that will be used for descriptive purposes. The analysis will not cover
local parties but is restricted to the seven parties that have traditionally
dominated national politics.28
Two crucially important features of the data are, first, that it contains
the same information on all candidates irrespective of whether they were
elected or not. Second, except for the 1994 election, it contains all ballot
paper rankings so that the final ranking that identifies the borderline groups
can be calculated.29 These two features, alone, make the data unique in its
kind. Furthermore, rich register-based information on characteristics such as
age, sex, foreign background, educational attainment, labor market status,
occupation and various income measures is matched to all candidates using
a unique person identifier. The registers are in annual form and cover the
years 1990–2006 for all candidates, which enables an empirical analysis that
(i) follows candidates over a relatively long time period; (ii) can verify the
identifying assumptions using pre-determined covariates; and (iii) looks at
heterogeneous treatment effects across characteristics such as age and level
of education.
27Candidates running for a county council are also covered, but this data will not be
used in this paper.
28The main reason for excluding local parties is that they are very diverse and would
therefore be likely to introduce unnecessary noise.
29Because the 1991 and 1998 election data contains somewhat less information than the
2002 election data, some assumptions were needed to find borderline groups in these two
elections. See the Appendix for details.
5.1 Outcome variables
The effects of being elected into a municipal council will be considered on a
short-, medium- and long-run basis which, as described in connection with
the identification strategy, for income outcomes translate into the time in-
dex t + j denoting the average over 1–3, 6–8 and 13–15 years after the
election in year t, respectively. For short-, medium- and long-run election
outcomes, t+ j denotes the first, second and fourth subsequent election, re-
spectively. Descriptive statistics of all outcomes in the sample of candidates
in borderline groups with rank? = {−2,−1, 0} are provided in Table 11 in
the Appendix. Below follows a description and motivation of the choice of
variables.
Disposable income —This variable is meant to capture all monetary re-
turns from politics. It is individualized but measured at the household level,
and is the sum of numerous types of after-tax income of the family, includ-
ing, e.g., labor income, capital income, pensions and unemployment and
sickness benefits. To the extent that there is intra-household bargaining—
so that also the income of the politician’s spouse could be affected—this is
a proper measure of total monetary returns. Note, though, that with the
available data it is also possible to check the sensitivity of the results to
alternative income measures.
To reduce the noise that often plagues income data, disposable income
is measured in three-year averages. For a candidate in the 1991 election,
for example, short-run income is the average income over years 1992–1994,
medium-run income is the average over years 1997–1999 and long-run income
is the average over years 2004–2006. To avoid results that are driven by
outliers, the three-year averages are censored at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
The analysis will be performed on logs of the three-year averages.
Monetary returns from politics will be positive if individuals acquire
certain skills that are rewarded in the labor market, if there is a positive
signaling effect or if the individuals develop closer ties to certain firms or
organizations. Note that such returns could be retained while still in pol-
itics, since the majority of local politicians hold regular jobs and, at least
partly, devote their spare time politics. While still in politics, there is also
the direct effect of official perquisites and remunerations. There is, however,
also the possibility of mechanisms operating in the opposite direction: po-
litical engagement may require foregone earnings because of time and effort
constraints.30
Monetary returns in the form of outright bribes will obviously be close
to impossible to measure, as these are unlikely to show up in official income
registers. But to the extent that politicians attempt to hide parts of their
(illegitimate) income by transferring official income within the household,
30The Municipal Law (4 Ch. 12§) states that elected representatives have the right to
be “reasonably compensated” for foregone earnings due to their political assignments.
such returns will show up in their disposable income.
Being nominated for/elected into a municipal council —These are indi-
cator variables measuring the probability of a candidate being nominated
to a municipal council in subsequent elections and the probability of being
elected into the council in subsequent elections. These outcomes will cap-
ture if being randomly elected into a council improves future political career
prospects locally.
As for potential effects on the probability of running, one can imagine
that being elected establishes closer connections to the local party organi-
zation which would increase the likelihood of future nominations, or that
being elected has a positive encouragement effect on continuing in politics
which would increase the likelihood of accepting a nomination. For some
individuals, on the other hand, being elected may imply learning and be-
ing disappointed by what local politics really is about which would then
discourage future political engagement.
The effects on being elected in future elections, or incumbency effects,
may in part operate via similar channels. Parties may reward “good politi-
cians” that, for example, stick to the party line by promoting them and
ranking them higher in subsequent elections. If such abilities are better re-
vealed in the council, being elected would thus affect the chances of being
reelected. But reelection probabilities may also be affected through more
traditional incumbency effects that operate via voters.
Being nominated for the national parliament —This is an indicator vari-
able measuring the probability of a candidate being nominated to the na-
tional parliament in subsequent elections. Advancing from the local to the
national arena is a likely goal among candidates who are motivated by po-
litical accomplishments and prestige and who want to pursue a political
career.
Because the parliament only has 349 seats, actually getting elected is a
very rare event, which is the reason why the analysis on national politics is
restricted to nominations. So, what does it mean to be nominated for the
national parliament? Naturally, the probability of actually being elected is
infinitely greater for those running than for those who do not. But, to some
extent, even non-elected parliamentary candidates have advanced from their
local political careers, since not all party members that wish to be nominated
actually are.
Although there is very little research on the vertical structure of political
parties in Sweden (Erlingsson, 2008), one can imagine that the mechanisms
operating locally to some degree extend to the national level. According
to Ba¨ck and Mo¨ller (2003), the local organizations constitute the basis for
the political parties as they are platforms for member recruitment and for
most meetings, and as they handle nominations of candidates to numerous
political assignments. However, although the local party organizations op-
erate separately from their central counterparts, there is arguably still some
degree of vertical interdependence.
5.2 Control variables
The register data includes numerous variables measuring the candidate’s
characteristics. Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of a set of
these variables (measured one year before the election) for three different
samples taken from the 1991, 1998 and 2002 election data that is the focus
of the paper; (i) column 1 includes all non-elected candidates; (ii) column 2
includes all elected candidates; and (iii) column 3 includes candidates with
rank? = {−2,−1, 0} in the borderline groups that constitute the sample
for the main econometric analysis. Comparing columns 1–2 with column 3
shows how representative the candidates in the borderline groups are (ig-
nore column 4 for now). For example, in terms of age and marital status,
the borderline groups are more similar to the non-elected sample, whereas
in terms of education they are more like the elected sample. Hence, the
representativity is in general quite good.
Since all time-variant covariates are set at one year before the election,
all variables in Table 1 are pre-determined and should hence not be affected
by the treatment. Therefore, one implication of the identifying assumption
(that the direct effect of rank is the same for ranks around the borderline
elected) is that the treatment effect conditional on these variables should
not differ from the unconditional treatment effect. This will be explored in
the result section.31
A mirror implication of the identifying assumption can be tested by
running the main equation (1) on pre-determined covariates. If the direct
effect of rank is linear among the candidates in the borderline groups, non-
linearities in pre-determined covariates should not be expected. In other
words, the estimate of β1 should not differ from zero. The rightmost column
of Table 1 provides the t-statistics of the β1 estimate from running these
regressions, which indeed are small enough to confirm that there are no
non-linearities in the direct effect of rank?.32
Aside from the variables in Table 1, individual controls will further in-
clude a set of dummies capturing past political experience by indicating
whether the candidate ran for/was elected into a municipal council in the
past three elections. Because the earliest election covered by the data is
1991, these dummies are censored or partly censored (set to zero) for bor-
derline groups in the 1991 and 1998 elections.
31Disposable income will be controlled for with quantile dummies, age with dummies for
10-year intervals and number of children linearly. All other control variables are binary.
32An analogous test is to run a regression of the binary variable elected on rank? and
all covariates in Table 1 and test for joint significance of the covariates. Doing this,
the obtained F-statistic is 0.80 (p-value 0.71), thus strengthening the confirmation of no
non-linearities.
Table 1: Representativity and balance in pre-determined characteristics of
candidates in borderline groups with rank? = {−2,−1, 0}
Sample β1
All non-elected All elected rank? = {−2,−1, 0} t-stat.
Disposable income 1189.4 1345.9 1204.6 0.88
(514.9) (574.0) (522.8)
Age 47.9 49.3 47.7 0.22
(12.9) (10.8) (12.1)
Children under 18 0.81 0.75 0.88 -0.46
(1.14) (1.10) (1.18)
Female 0.40 0.40 0.41 -1.08
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Married 0.66 0.71 0.66 1.50
(0.47) (0.45) (0.47)
Less than high school 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.57
(0.40) (0.37) (0.36)
High school graduate 0.43 0.40 0.40 -1.13
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
< 2 years university 0.061 0.072 0.070 1.41
(0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
≥ 2 years university 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.15
(0.46) (0.48) (0.48)
Graduate studies 0.0083 0.0094 0.0093 -0.92
(0.091) (0.097) (0.096)
Born in Sweden 0.94 0.95 0.94 -0.47
(0.25) (0.22) (0.25)
Born in other Nordic country 0.029 0.026 0.030 -0.79
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Born in non-Nordic Europe 0.020 0.017 0.018 1.09
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Born in North America 0.0021 0.0011 0.0023 -0.08
(0.045) (0.033) (0.048)
Born elsewhere 0.014 0.0091 0.014 0.94
(0.12) (0.095) (0.12)
Both parents foreign-born 0.0087 0.0068 0.010 -0.15
(0.093) (0.082) (0.100)
Observations 109369 38229 16738 16738
Note: Columns 1–3 report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of variables measured one
year before the election. Column 4 reports the t-statistic of the estimate of β1 from running equation
(1) on each of the variables on the sample of candidates with rank? = {−2,−1, 0} in the borderline
groups. Income is measured in 100 SEK deflated to 2000 year values (6.50 SEK≈1 USD). The education
variables indicate highest completed level. Born elsewhere equals one for individuals born in Africa, Asia,
Oceania, Russia or S. America. Both parents foreign-born equals one for individuals born in Sweden
but with both parents foreign-born. All variables but Disposable income, Age and Children under 18
are binary.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
6 Characterizing the treatment
The treatment group and the control group consist of candidates who got
their party’s last seat and those who were next in line to get a seat had their
party won enough additional votes, respectively. The idea is that a compar-
ison of these two groups will capture exogenous differences along dimensions
such as political experience, power, success and representation. While Sec-
tion 4 laid out the assumptions under which the exogeneity requirement is
fulfilled, I now discuss what the treatment—being elected into a municipal
council vs. being close to being elected—is likely to capture.
An important aspect is the appointment of council replacements to stand
in for regular council members in the case of defection or absence from a
meeting. Based on the ranking on the ballot paper from which each of the
regular council members were elected, non-elected candidates are appointed
replacements. A replacement can stand in for several regular members, and
the total number of replacements to be appointed is decided by the council
prior to the election (as a share below half of the total seats won).
Thus, it is quite likely that candidates in the control group (in particular
the borderline defeated) serve as council replacements. If actual political
experience is what matters for income and political career prospects, it is
thus sensible to define treatment as actually having served in the council,
rather than being elected into the council on election day. If any regular
council member resigns early in the election period and a candidate in the
control group thereby gets a permanent seat in the council, and/or if the
borderline elected is the one who resigns, the variation in treatment status—
defined in this way—will, therefore, be fuzzy at the threshold at rank? = 0.
Fortunately, at least for the 2002 and 2006 elections, there is information
on early resignations and effective replacements that can tell the extent
to which the treatment effects obtained from running the regression in (1)
underestimate effects of being de facto treated (i.e., actually having served in
the council). If borderline elected candidates are defined as having de facto
been treated if they did not resign during the first year after the election
date, and if defeated candidates are defined as having been de facto treated if
they overtook someone’s permanent council seat at least 300 days before the
next election,33 then, according to the 2002 and 2006 data, 95% and 40% of
all borderline elected and defeated were de facto treated, respectively. The
corresponding percentage among candidates ranked −2 is around 20%.
If this information were available for all elections, a fuzzy RDD with the
probability of being de facto treated as a discontinuous function of rank? as
the first stage would be ideal. As revealed by the percentages just stated,
running such a first stage on the 2002 and 2006 data on candidates in the
borderline groups with rank? = {−2,−1, 0} yields an estimate of around
33Note that the new council is not formally in place immediately after the next election.
0.30 (with a t-statistic of 18.5). Thus, although the treatment of having
actually served in the council is not deterministically determined by rank?,
there is still substantial discontinuous variation at the threshold at rank? =
0.
Another aspect is that committee work outside of the council provides
alternative forums for political engagement. Only politicians in the munic-
ipal council are directly elected by the voters. However, when the council
subsequently appoints members to working committees (and committee re-
placements), they can do so both from within as well as from outside the
council. The term “elected representative” in the Municipal Law refers both
to regular council members directly elected by the voters, municipal council
replacements as well as to those appointed to committees by the council.
With this definition, the number of locally elected representatives exceeds
the number of municipal council members by far.
However, we know that exerting the formal power as placed on the mu-
nicipal council by the Municipal Law is reserved to council members, and
this should be considered as an important part of the treatment. This means
that, if—as has been expressed—substantial de facto power is concentrated
to the executive board and major committees, council members can influ-
ence the composition of committees in a way that is favorable to themselves
by, e.g., appointing themselves or fellow council members. That 90% of
the executive board are also members of the council (Ba¨ck, 1993; Ba¨ck and
O¨hrvall, 2004) suggests this to be the case. Information on the number and
type of positions held by the politicians in the data available here (unfor-
tunately only for the 2006 election) also supports this argument; 8% of the
borderline elected in 2006 are members of the executive board, whereas the
corresponding percentage is merely around 1.5–2.5 among candidates ranked
−1 or −2. Furthermore, also according to the 2006 data, the borderline de-
feated are not compensated with positions in other committees, in the sense
that the borderline elected hold, on average, one more regular position than
the borderline defeated (1.6 compared to 0.7).
Thus, it is clear that being borderline elected into a municipal council
vs. being close to being elected induces differences in dimensions such as
political representation and power. The remainder of the paper will show if
and how these differences affect income and political career prospects.
7 Monetary returns from being elected
To start investigating what types of payoffs that motivate politicians, this
section looks at the monetary returns from politics by analyzing the effect
of being elected into a municipal council on short-, medium- and long-run
income as measured by the log of disposable income 1–3, 6–8 and 13–15
years after being elected, respectively. The analysis combines graphical pre-
sentations with econometric methods as described in Section 4.
Let us first look at the graphics in Figure 4. It plots the rank?-specific
means of disposable income in the three different periods. The plot to the
left shows raw means, whereas the plot to the right shows conditional means
obtained from a regression of the outcome variable on a set of individual con-
trols measured one year before the election; the number of children aged be-
low 18 and a set of dummies for age, gender, marital status, income quantile,
highest completed education, foreign background and past political experi-
ence. Recall that the variable rank? is defined as the difference between a
candidate’s final rank and the final rank of the borderline elected, so that
it takes the value zero for the borderline elected and negative values for
non-elected candidates.
Figure 4: Short-, medium- and long-run disposable income
(a) Raw means
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Note: The figures plot means of disposable income by rank from borderline elected in election
year t. Income is deflated to 2000 year values and measured as logs of three-year averages in
the short run (years t+1 to t+3), medium run (years t+6 to t+8) and long run (years t+13 to
t+15). Conditional means are the residuals obtained from a regression of the outcome variable on
the following individual controls measured one year before the election: the number of children
aged below 18 and a set of dummies for age, gender, marital status, income quantile, highest
completed education, foreign background and past political experience.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
Direct effects of rank? on the outcome are represented by the overall
slope of the lines connecting the rank?-specific means. Conceptually, the
treatment effect is the difference between the borderline elected (rank? = 0)
and the borderline defeated (rank? = −1) that is above and beyond the
difference between any other two candidates. Visually, a treatment effect
therefore corresponds to a kink in the slope at rank? = −1. The raw
means to the left thus reveal small or zero effects on income from being
elected.34 This is particularly clear for medium-run income, where any kink
34Not only are the treatment effects absent, but what might be somewhat surprising
is that also the direct effects of rank? are negligible. Thus, to the extent that income is
a proxy for ability (in some broader sense), candidates around the borderline elected are
not ranked according to this.
at rank? = −1 is completely absent. For short- and long-run income, a slight
kink can be detected. For the latter, however, as there is a considerably
more distinct kink at rank? = −3, this is more likely to be due to random
variation than to a treatment effect.
Comparing the left and the right plots, the main difference is that there
is a mean-adjustment to zero for all income periods (as these are residuals).
Although this adjustment makes the plot less clear, it is suggestive of the
same pattern as in the raw means, which thus suggests that to extensively
control for pre-determined characteristics would not alter the results.
The econometric counterpart to the plots in Figure 4 is given in Table
2, providing the results from estimating equation (1) on candidates with
rank? = {−2,−1, 0}. Note that the parameter β2 is the marginal effect of
rank? and thus corresponds to the overall slopes in the plots, whereas β1 is
the main parameter of interest that captures the additional effect of having
rank? = 0, or the effect of being elected.
The results in column 1 are for short-run income without any further
controls while column 2 controls for the same set of individual controls as in
the right plot with the conditional means. Equivalent results for medium-
and long-run income are given in columns 3–4 and 5–6, respectively. As
seen in the table, none of the estimated treatment effects are statistically
significant and the point estimates are very close to zero either with controls
(for the short and long run) or without controls (for the medium run).
Note especially that the suspected kinks in short- and long-run income seen
graphically are not statistically significant. Qualitatively, the inclusion of
controls makes no difference, and—although the size of the estimates changes
when controls are included—estimates with and without controls are within
the 95% confidence interval of one another. In all regards, the econometric
results thus confirm the graphical inspection.
7.1 Returns while in vs. after exiting politics
Some candidates elected in a particular election are still active politicians 6–
8 and 13–15 years later, while others are not. The candidates’ medium- and
long-run income should be seen as the result of optimizing behavior, which
may lead to political careers of different length for different people. But it is
also of interest to see whether returns to politics kick in after leaving politics.
In general, however, looking at income conditional on exiting politics is
problematic since exit is endogenous. For example, some politicians may
exit because they expect it to be profitable, and others may exit because
they were unsuccessful incumbents.
A way of circumventing this problem is to look at the income profile of
candidates who were not only elected by chance, but who also left politics
for exogenous reasons. An exogenous source of variation in exit rates that
lies close at hand is being borderline defeated. To this end, Figure 5 plots
T
a
b
le
2:
E
ff
ec
ts
of
b
ei
n
g
el
ec
te
d
on
d
is
p
os
ab
le
in
co
m
e
P
er
io
d
(t
+
1
)–
(t
+
3
)
P
er
io
d
(t
+
6
)–
(t
+
8
)
P
er
io
d
(t
+
1
3
)–
(t
+
1
5
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
el
ec
te
d
0.
0
1
9
9
0
.0
0
4
1
2
0
.0
0
2
7
1
-0
.0
1
8
4
0
.0
3
2
7
-0
.0
0
8
2
3
(0
.0
12
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
8
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
1
5
4
)
(0
.0
2
8
2
)
(0
.0
2
4
6
)
ra
n
k
?
0.
00
2
6
0
0
.0
0
4
0
9
0
.0
1
9
2∗
0
.0
2
3
0∗
∗∗
0
.0
0
7
1
3
0
.0
1
9
2
(0
.0
07
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
5
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
8
8
3
)
(0
.0
1
6
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
16
67
3
1
6
6
7
3
1
0
9
1
5
1
0
9
1
5
5
2
8
3
5
2
8
3
In
d
iv
id
u
al
co
n
tr
ol
s
n
o
ye
s
n
o
ye
s
n
o
ye
s
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
eff
ec
ts
o
f
b
ei
n
g
el
ec
te
d
in
to
a
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
l
co
u
n
ci
l
o
n
d
is
p
o
sa
b
le
in
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
lo
g
s
o
f
th
re
e-
y
ea
r
a
v
er
a
g
es
1
–
3
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
1
–
2
),
6
–
8
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
3
–
4
)
a
n
d
1
3
–
1
5
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
5
–
6
)
y
ea
rs
a
ft
er
th
e
el
ec
ti
o
n
.
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l
co
n
tr
o
ls
m
ea
su
re
d
o
n
e
y
ea
r
b
ef
o
re
th
e
el
ec
ti
o
n
a
re
:
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ch
il
d
re
n
a
g
ed
b
el
o
w
1
8
a
n
d
a
se
t
o
f
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
a
g
e,
g
en
d
er
,
m
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s,
in
co
m
e
q
u
a
n
ti
le
,
h
ig
h
es
t
co
m
p
le
te
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
fo
re
ig
n
b
a
ck
g
ro
u
n
d
a
n
d
p
a
st
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
o
n
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
*
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
d
en
o
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
the income profile of candidates who were borderline elected in 1998 and
borderline defeated in 2002. This is to be compared with the income profile
of candidates who were borderline defeated in 1998 and not elected in 2002
either, whose income profile is also seen in the figure. These candidates
were neither elected in previous elections in the data (1991 or 1994), nor in
the next election (2006). 975 candidates of the borderline defeated in 1998
satisfy these conditions, but only 59 of the borderline elected in 1998.
As seen in the figure, the income levels are very similar several years
before the 1998 election, while being in office as well as after exiting. The
exceptions are the few years preceding the 1998 election, when the income of
those who get elected later is lower. Although, because of the small sample
size, one should perhaps be careful about reading too much into this pattern.
That there is no income gain following the exogenous exit from politics in
2002 is, however, clear.
Figure 5: Disposable income while in vs. after exiting politics
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Note: The figure plots average disposable income among candidates who were borderline elected
in 1998 and borderline defeated in 2002, and among candidates who were borderline defeated in
1998. Income is measured in logs of 100 SEK deflated to 2000 year values.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
The above results all lead to the conclusion that monetary returns from
politics are, on average, absent irrespective of if one considers the period
right after the election, up to 15 years later or the period right after exiting
politics. To support this conclusion, I have done further analyses on (i) total
labor income and labor income from the largest source in stead of disposable
income; and (ii) heterogeneous effects across parties, council size, party size,
ruling status of the party and candidate’s age, political experience, education
level and pre-election income. None of these analyses show any systematic
effects of being elected, thus strengthening the conclusion that there is no
monetary payoff from politics.
8 Effects on future political careers
Given that monetary returns from politics are absent, politicians are likely
not motivated by that. Rather, it seems that there are some non-monetary
returns that politicians pursue. These can be in the form of political ac-
complishments, a sense of actively taking part in the community, the desire
to affect society in a certain direction, prestige and power—types of returns
that are hard if not impossible to measure. However, such non-monetary re-
turns are to a large extent encompassed by a candidate’s political career. In
what follows I therefore investigate if being elected into a municipal council
improves future political career prospects. I begin by studying if, for ex-
ogenous reasons, being elected improves the chances of being elected also
in future local elections, and then move on to see whether it increases the
chances of advancing to national politics. Analogously to the previous sec-
tion on monetary returns, most of the analysis on political careers is carried
out graphically as well as econometrically.
8.1 Local politics
I start by assessing if being elected into a municipal council in election year t
has an effect on the probability of running in future elections to a municipal
council in the short, medium and long run, corresponding to the first, second
and fourth subsequent election, respectively. The results are presented in
Figure 6 and Table 3, and are to be read in the same way as above except
that the outcome is now the probability of being nominated for election
instead of income.
Like those above, these graphs are quite illustrative. Not surprisingly,
there is a positive direct relationship between rank? and the probability of
running in future elections to a municipal council, as seen from the overall
positive slopes. However, there is little evidence of any treatment effect of
being elected, as there is no kink in the slope between the borderline elected
and defeated (at rank? = −1), except maybe in the second subsequent
election. This pattern is confirmed by Table 3, where all estimates are
statistically insignificant except the one for the election in t + 2 (at the
10% level and only without individual controls). Controlling for individual
characteristics barely affects the point estimates and—just like for income—
the only graphical differences are in the intercepts.
The large average probabilities of running in future elections as seen from
the left plot in Figure 6 show that there is a high degree of persistence in
who runs for elections, especially in the short run. One possibility is that
candidates who are not ranked sufficiently high to be elected in election t to
a large extent also run in subsequent elections because they perceive their
chances of being elected to increase, perhaps if they are compensated by
being ranked higher. If that is the case, one should expect no effect of being
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Figure 6: Probabilities of being nominated in future elections to a municipal
council
(a) Raw probabilities
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(b) Conditional probabilities
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Note: The figures plot the probability of being nominated in future elections to a municipal
council by rank from borderline elected in election year t. Conditional probabilities are the
residuals obtained from a regression of the outcome variable on the following individual controls
measured one year before the election: the number of children aged below 18 and a set of
dummies for age, gender, marital status, income quantile, highest completed education, foreign
background and past political experience.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
elected at time t on also being elected in future elections.
These future election probabilities are assessed in Figure 7 and Table
4.35 Focusing on candidates with rank? = {−2,−1, 0}, from the graphics
one can detect a positive short-run treatment effect (i.e., being elected in the
first subsequent election), as there is a kink between the borderline elected
and defeated. According to columns 1–2 in Table 4, this effect is a statis-
tically significant 6 percentage points and it is unaffected when controlling
for individual characteristics. As suggested by Figure 7 and as confirmed
in columns 3–6 in Table 4, there are, however, no effects of being elected in
election t on also being elected in elections t+ 2 and t+ 4.
In terms of magnitude, 6 percentage points amount to about the same
size as the direct effect of rank?, and around 20% of the mean election rate
in election t + 1 for the sets of three candidates with rank? = {−2,−1, 0}
in the borderline groups (see the descriptive statistics in the Appendix).
However, recall from the discussion in Section 6 that a fair share of the
borderline defeated who initially were council replacements in fact overtook
a permanent council seat, so that—if treatment is defined as actually having
35Note that these are unconditional election probabilities, in the sense that they are
not conditional on running. The reason for this is that the decision to run in future
elections can conceptually be an outcome due to the treatment, which means that a causal
interpretation of the conditional effects on being elected would not be valid. In practice,
because of the previous result that there are no large effects on running probabilities,
conditioning on running only scales up the future election probabilities without making a
qualitative difference.
Figure 7: Probabilities of being elected in future elections to a municipal
council
(a) Raw probabilities
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Note: The figures plot the probability of being elected in future elections to a municipal council
by rank from borderline elected in election year t. Conditional probabilities are the residuals
obtained from a regression of the outcome variable on the following individual controls measured
one year before the election: the number of children aged below 18 and a set of dummies for age,
gender, marital status, income quantile, highest completed education, foreign background and
past political experience.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
served in the council—treatment status is fuzzy at the threshold at rank? =
0. Evaluating the magnitude of such a treatment effect requires scaling up
the coefficient by around three (since the first stage is estimated to around
0.30). Thus, the obtained result means that having served in the council in
the previous election period explains as much as 60% of the probability of
being elected in the next election.36
For the borderline elected’s 6 percentage points higher probability of
being elected in the next election obtained above to be interpreted as a
causal treatment effect, the direct effect of rank? must be at most of order
one for rank? = {−2,−1, 0}. Since this is an identifying assumption, it
is not possible to test it directly. But there are several ways of indirectly
investigating whether the obtained effects are likely to be causal. First,
it is more likely that the direct effect is linear between this set of three
candidates if it is also linear for another set of three candidates close by—
i.e., if there are no kinks in the slope of rank? of similar magnitude between
any other two candidates further down the ranking. This can be more or less
inferred from the graphics, but it can also be formally tested with placebo
regressions that, falsely, assign the borderline elected status to candidates
with rank? = −1 or rank? = −2. Doing this on the probability of being
elected in the first subsequent election to a municipal council results in
estimated coefficients that are about 30–40% of the size of the effect for the
36Although by the same token, if they become council replacements, some of those who
are not elected in the next election can also end up serving in the council.
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true borderline elected (i.e., around 2–2.5 percentage points) and that are
also statistically significant.37
One possible interpretation of these placebo estimates is that there is a
non-linear direct effect of rank? (which is in fact suggested by Figure 7).
But if the direct effect of rank is of higher order than one for the set of three
candidates with rank? = {−2,−1, 0} and for candidates further down the
ranking, the effect of being elected can still be recovered by—as explained
in Section 4—running equation (2) on more than three candidates per bor-
derline group. The resulting estimates from this exercise are found in Table
5. Equation (2) is estimated on the sample of borderline elected candidates
plus ten defeated candidates in columns 1, 3 and 5, for the first, second
and fourth election, respectively. In columns 2, 4 and 6, five instead of ten
defeated candidates are included in the estimations. Each column contains
results from three different regressions with a linear, quadratic or qubic func-
tion of rank?, of which the one preferred by the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) is in bold.
The point estimates as well as the significance levels seen in Table 5 are
somewhat sensitive to different bandwidths (the number of defeated candi-
dates included) and order of polynomial. But restricting the attention to
the AIC-preferred specifications, the previous result in Table 4 from estimat-
ing the baseline regression (1) is quite robust; being borderline elected in
election t increases the chances of being elected in election t+ 1 by around
5 percentage points (compared to 6 in Table 3), but does not affect the
election probabilities in later elections.
An alternative way of investigating the linearity assumption underlying
the baseline results in Table 4 is to test whether the estimates differ when it
is unlikely that the parties could have known who would be the borderline
elected to win the last seat. The idea is that the ranking of candidates
would be different if it was a priori certain who would actually be elected. I
propose a number of instances when there was presumably more uncertainty
regarding this, and present the results in Table 6 (where column 1 reproduces
the baseline results with controls in column 2 of Table 4): (i) the party’s
number of seats changed from the previous election, cf. column 2; (ii) the
party won their last seat or were close to winning an additional seat with a
vote margin of less than 1 and 0.5%, cf. columns 3–4; and (iii) a combination
of (i) and (ii), cf. column 5.38 The table shows estimates that are quite
robust across the different specifications. For example, the estimate hardly
changes even when the sample size is cut in half as the vote margin of the
last seat is restricted to 0.5%. This is reassuring evidence that parties in
37The placebo estimates are found in columns 1–2 of Table 12 in the Appendix.
38The robustness checks are performed on the probability of being elected in the first
subsequent election to a municipal council where the baseline estimates were significant.
As vote margins, I use the minimum changes in votes to win or lose an additional seat in
proportional elections as defined and calculated by Folke (2011).
Table 5: Effects of being elected on the probability of being elected in future
elections to a municipal council; allowing non-linear effects of rank?
Election t+1 Election t+2 Election t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
elected, p¯ = 1 0.156∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0178∗
(0.00774) (0.00898) (0.00810) (0.00981) (0.00824) (0.0102)
elected, p¯ = 2 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0511∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗ -0.000853 0.0130 -0.00437
(0.00948) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0107) (0.0165)
elected, p¯ = 3 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0210 0.00972 -0.0132 0.00233 -0.0227
(0.0124) (0.0257) (0.0143) (0.0297) (0.0156) (0.0361)
Observations 54798 32504 36430 21620 18239 10888
rank? ≥ -10 -5 -10 -5 -10 -5
Note: The table reports effects of being elected into a municipal council on the probability of being
elected in the first (columns 1–2), second (columns 3–4) and fourth (columns 5–6) subsequent election
to a municipal council. The AIC-preferred polynomial is in bold. Standard errors clustered on
municipality are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 6: Robustness checks of the effects on being elected in the first sub-
sequent election to a municipal council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
elected 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗ 0.0420∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0162) (0.0158) (0.0202) (0.0186)
rank? 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0612∗∗∗ 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗
(0.00732) (0.00870) (0.00840) (0.0113) (0.00994)
Observations 16754 12692 13283 7737 10080
Vote margin (%) no restr. no restr. 1 0.5 1
|∆seats| ≥ 1 no yes no no yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The table reports effects of being elected into a municipal council on the probability of
being elected in the first subsequent election to a municipal council. Column 1 reproduces the
baseline results in column 2 of Table 4. All regressions include individual controls (cf. Table 4).
Standard errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
general cannot perfectly anticipate how many votes they will win and rank
their candidates accordingly.
8.2 National politics
If politicians are motivated by politics-specific non-monetary payoffs such
as power or prestige, their goal should be to pursue a successful political
career. So far, the analysis has focused on local political careers. This
section investigates whether being a local politician can be a path to national
politics. Specifically, I investigate whether being elected into a municipal
council in election t affects the probability of being nominated to the national
parliament in election t+1, t+2 and t+4. The outline is the same as in the
previous section; I begin by presenting graphical and econometric results,
and then perform a robustness check of the baseline results.
Effects are presented graphically in Figure 8 with associated estimates
in Table 7, which reveal a clear and significant positive effect in the short
and medium run (first and second subsequent elections). The magnitude is
around 2–3 percentage points in both elections (although somewhat higher in
the short run), which is around twice the size of the estimated direct effect
of rank? and around 30% of the overall mean probability of running for
the national parliament among candidates with rank? = {−2,−1, 0} in the
borderline groups. Considering, instead, the treatment of actually having
served in the council (of which the average probability jumps by around 0.30
for the borderline elected)39, an alternative interpretation of these results
is that short- and medium-run chances of being nominated to the national
parliament are almost fully explained by municipal council experience.
Compared to the graphical analysis on local election probabilities above
(cf. Figure 7), the linearity assumption in the direct effect of rank? seems
less restrictive here. Moreover, supporting the interpretation of the kinks at
rank? = −1 as representing an effect of being elected is that placebo regres-
sions of the short- and medium-run probabilities of being nominated to the
national parliament that assign the borderline elected status to candidates
with rank? = −1 or rank? = −2 yield small and insignificant estimates—a
result in accordance with what is suggested by the graphs.40
For long-run effects—that is, for effects on being nominated in election
t+ 4—the graphs are suggestive of a kink at rank? = −2. In a placebo re-
gression, this “effect” is estimated to 2 percentage points and is significant
at the 10% level. Because this is a long-run outcome, a possible explanation
is that the borderline defeated in election t ran successfully for the munic-
39Recall from Section 6 that this figure is obtained by using the 2002 and 2006 election
data to estimate a first stage with the probability of actually having served in the council
as a discontinuous function of rank?.
40Placebo estimates for the probability of being nominated for the national parliament
are provided in Table 13 in the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Probabilities of being nominated in future elections to the national
parliament
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Note: The figures plot the probability of being nominated in future elections to the national
parliament by rank from borderline elected in election year t. Conditional probabilities are the
residuals obtained from a regression of the outcome variable on the following individual controls
measured one year before the election: the number of children aged below 18 and a set of
dummies for age, gender, marital status, income quantile, highest completed education, foreign
background and past political experience.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
ipal council in election t + 1, which increased the chances of running for
parliament in election t+ 4.
As in the previous section, the baseline results in Table 7 from estimating
equation (1) on the set of three candidates per borderline group are comple-
mented with results from estimating equation (2), expanding the bandwidth
to include five or ten defeated candidates. The results are given in Table 8.
These estimates are more robust across the different bandwidths and poly-
nomials, and thus give little reason to doubt the effect of a 2–3 percentage
point increase in the probability of being nominated in the first and second
subsequent election to the national parliament.
To further support this conclusion, Table 9 tests the robustness of the
statistically significant effects on being nominated for parliament in elections
t + 1 and t + 2. Column 1 reproduces the baseline estimates with controls
in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7, and columns 2–4 are the result from the
same set of robustness checks as in Table 6 for local politics above. As can
be seen, the effects in the first subsequent election are very robust, while
the effects in the election thereafter only partly survive the various sample
restrictions. For the latter, the drop in the coefficient is especially large
when the sample is restricted to parties that were 0.5% votes from winning
or losing an additional seat (column 4, bottom panel). This drop is most
likely due to a combination of the sample size reduction of 50% and—as
is shown in Lundqvist (2011)—the fact that effects are quite heterogeneous
across party and council size.
Table 8: Effects of being elected on the probability of being nominated in future
elections to the national parliament; allowing non-linear effects of rank?
Election t+1 Election t+2 Election t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
elected, p¯ = 1 0.0566∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗
(0.00560) (0.00648) (0.00541) (0.00645) (0.00612) (0.00717)
elected, p¯ = 2 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0108 -0.00208
(0.00688) (0.0102) (0.00687) (0.00876) (0.00776) (0.0117)
elected, p¯ = 3 0.0240∗∗ 0.0458∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.00986 0.00689 -0.0274
(0.00934) (0.0181) (0.00861) (0.0180) (0.0104) (0.0234)
Observations 54798 32504 36430 21620 18239 10888
rank? ≥ -10 -5 -10 -5 -10 -5
Note: The table reports effects of being elected into a municipal council on the probability of being
nominated in the first (columns 1–2), second (columns 3–4) and fourth (columns 5–6) subsequent elec-
tion to the national parliament. The AIC-preferred polynomial is in bold. Standard errors clustered
on municipality are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 9: Robustness checks of the effects on being nominated in the first
and second subsequent elections to the national parliament
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election t+ 1
elected 0.0333∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗
(0.00990) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0139) (0.0117)
rank? 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.00816 0.00877 0.00697
(0.00490) (0.00565) (0.00543) (0.00707) (0.00620)
Observations 16754 12692 13283 7737 10080
Election t+ 2
elected 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0171 0.0276∗∗ 0.0123 0.0217∗
(0.00965) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0138) (0.0116)
rank? 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0158∗∗ 0.0119∗
(0.00548) (0.00655) (0.00585) (0.00787) (0.00673)
Observations 11208 8662 8947 5276 6934
Vote margin (%) no restr. no restr. 1 0.5 1
|∆seats| ≥ 1 no yes no no yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The table reports effects of being elected into a municipal council on the probability
of being elected in the first (top panel) and second (bottom panel) subsequent election to the
national parliament. Column 1 reproduces the baseline results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7. All
regressions include individual controls (cf. Table 7). Standard errors clustered on municipality
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
9 Heterogeneity and external validity of the re-
sults
The results from the above section on future political careers can be summa-
rized as revealing positive effects of being borderline elected into a municipal
council on, first, the chances of being elected also in the next local election
and, second, on the probability of being nominated to the national parlia-
ment in subsequent elections. Before concluding the paper, this section first
provides a few notes on the heterogeneity in these average effects, and then
discusses whether the results can be generalized from marginal, borderline
politicians to more prominent, successful ones.
Interestingly, the analysis of heterogeneous effects conducted in Lundqvist
(2011) shows that the effects on political career prospects do not differ to
any considerable extent across candidates with different levels of education
(at least not when considering the chances of advancing to the national
arena), across different age categories or across candidates with or without
previous political experience.41 The only differences of any significance are
those across council and party size; the positive effects of being borderline
elected on future local election probabilities and national nominations are
especially pronounced for candidates running for smaller parties and smaller
councils. One possible mechanism behind this pattern is that those border-
line elected into larger parties are marginal politicians who are less visible,
whereas those borderline elected into smaller parties can be quite prominent
figures. Under this mechanism, the interpretation of the results is that what
is of importance for political career prospects is being a prominent local
representative, and not simply being elected.42
The distinction between the prominent figures and the more marginal
politicians motivates a discussion of the external validity of the results ob-
tained with the method in the paper focusing on borderline candidates. In
particular, returns to politics for these candidates may not be representa-
tive for successful politicians (or even for the “average politician”). I address
this concern by checking whether there are any successful politicians at all
among the borderline elected.
41A caveat with the comparisons of some of the subgroup specific effects, however, is
that they are estimated with rather poor precision.
42An alternative but related explanation for this pattern is that what matters for po-
litical career prospects is actual council experience, rather than being elected into the
council on election day. This would imply that the null effects among the larger parties
are explained by a lack of sufficient variation in council experience between the borderline
elected and defeated candidates. The reason for this—i.e., why the de facto treatment
of actually having served in the council is more “fuzzy” between elected and defeated
candidates in the larger parties—is that, because a replacement can stand in for several
regular members, defeated candidates from larger parties who are council replacements
are more likely to take over a permanent seat (as compared to defeated candidates from
smaller parties).
For this purpose, “political successes” that are measurable with the avail-
able data need to be defined, and here I distinguish between local and na-
tional careers: A local career is defined to be successful for politicians who
are appointed chair/vice chair in the executive board or for those whose po-
litical assignments constitute their main job (defined as receiving political
renumeration amounting to at least 75% of a full-time assignment).43 Since
this information is only available in the 2006 data, all local careers are de-
fined in that election period. A national career is defined to be successful for
politicians who are elected into the national parliament. Motivated by the
extensive analysis of national nomination probabilities above, I also define
“quasi-national successes” as those who are nominated for but not elected
into the national parliament. National careers are defined in any election
following the one in which the candidate was borderline elected into the lo-
cal council, but not later than the 2006 election since this is where the data
ends.
With these definitions, 38 of the borderline elected (from the 1991, 1998
or the 2002 election) have a successful local career in the executive board, 37
have a salaried local political assignment, 1032 are only nominated for the
national parliament and 39 are indeed elected into the parliament. While—
except for the nationally nominated—these are too few to allow for any
rigorous econometric analysis like that above, a statistical description of
these more prominent figures is definitely worthwhile. Hence, columns 2–5
of Table 10 provide summary statistics characterizing these four groups of
politicians with different political careers. For comparison, the same is given
in column 1 for the remaining 4587 borderline elected who do not fall into
any of the four success categories.44
The top of the table, showing the distribution over election periods in
which they were borderline elected, reveals an interesting picture: Compared
to those without a successful political career (in the sense as just defined),
a much smaller fraction of the successes are borderline elected in the 2002
but instead already in the 1991 election (except for the “Salaried” where the
majority is from the 1998 election). Given how the successes are defined,
this pattern indicates that politicians are required to stick around for many
election periods before their career peaks. The next two rows support this
claim by showing that many indeed do so; of the five elections held between
1991 and 2006 covered by the data, politicians with successful local careers
on average ran 4–4.4 times and were elected as many as 3.6–3.8 times. Also
those without any success ran quite frequently—on average in three out of
43Recall that only around 8% of the politicians elected into the council receive full-time
or part-time compensation.
44There is some overlap between the four success categories: 16 candidates are both
in the “Executive” and “Salaried” category; 15 candidates are both in the “Executive”
and “Nominated” category; 21 candidates are both in the “Salaried” and “Nominated”
category and 1 candidate is both in the “Salaried” and “Elected” category.
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of borderline elected candidates with differ-
ent future political careers
Local career National career
No career Executive Salaried Nominated Elected
t = 1991 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.59
(0.47) (0.51) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
t = 1998 0.33 0.29 0.49 0.28 0.26
(0.47) (0.46) (0.51) (0.45) (0.44)
t = 2002 0.35 0.24 0.16 0.25 0.15
(0.48) (0.43) (0.37) (0.43) (0.37)
# nominated locally 3.07 4.42 4.05 3.67 3.64
(1.38) (0.89) (0.91) (1.22) (1.20)
# elected locally 1.86 3.87 3.57 2.50 2.87
(1.06) (1.26) (1.21) (1.22) (1.30)
# nominated nationally 0.20 0.79 1.19 2.14 3.36
(0.54) (0.99) (1.24) (1.18) (1.31)
# elected nationally 0.00065 0 0.054 0.0048 1.87
(0.033) (0) (0.33) (0.082) (1.10)
Party size 7.98 10.1 12.9 4.36 6.44
(7.18) (7.02) (7.75) (4.75) (7.87)
Council size 47.3 46.4 59.5 49.5 59.5
(12.9) (9.61) (16.1) (14.2) (19.5)
Observations 4587 38 37 1032 39
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the sample of bor-
derline elected candidates to a municipal council in elections t ∈ {1991, 1998, 2002}, separately
by their future political careers. Local careers are defined in the 2006–10 election period. Na-
tional careers are defined in any election t+ j covered by the data. Party/Council size indicate
the number of seats held by the party/the total number of seats in election period t.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
five elections—but had a notably lower election rate.
Naturally, those who had a national career after having been borderline
elected locally ran and were elected in fewer local elections than those with
a successful local career, but still more frequently than the unsuccessful
ones. It is also interesting that those who were later indeed elected into the
parliament were on average nominated thereto in more than three out of
five elections, and that conditional on being elected at least once later, they
were on average elected close to one additional time (where only a few were
elected nationally in the same or previous elections as when being borderline
elected locally)45.
The last two rows in the table are motivated by the heterogeneous effects
across party and council size as found by Lundqvist (2011) and alluded
to above—the smaller average party size in column 4 partly reflects the
more pronounced effects on national nomination probabilities for candidates
running for smaller parties.46 However, politicians with a successful local
career on average run for larger parties. This is most likely explained by the
fact that larger parties have more seats in the executive board (by default)
as well as a larger number of salaried positions.
Table 10 portrays the borderline elected candidates with the five different
definitions of future careers in the political dimension. But what about
income: Do different future political careers also imply different income
streams? Annually over 1990–2006, Figure 9 plots disposable income for
borderline elected candidates from the 1991 election, grouped as in Table 10
but with the two different local careers merged into one category.47 Although
the different income series start out very similar, as is revealed quite clearly,
those with a future successful local or national political career do indeed
have substantially higher income later on as compared both to the “quasi-
national successes” and the unsuccessful ones. A caveat is of course the
small number of successes (only 25 and 23 of the borderline elected in 1991
are defined to have a successful career locally and nationally, respectively).
But even aside from the small sample, the picture in Figure 9 should be
interpreted with care. Specifically, the higher income among those with a
successful local career and those elected nationally as compared to those who
are only nominated nationally and the unsuccessful ones is not necessarily
45Note that the variables # nominated/elected locally/nationally are defined over all
election periods covered by the data, whereas the success categories are defined in election
periods after the candidate was borderline elected. This explains, for example, why some
individuals who were nominated to the national parliament at least once over the entire
period are categorized as “No career” and not as “Nominated”.
46Although only partly so since the estimated heterogeneous effects in Lundqvist (2011)
are separate within-differences in outcomes for the borderline elected and the borderline
defeated, whereas Table 10 displays between-differences of the borderline elected.
47There are several reasons for combining the two categories of local careers; (i) the
small number of candidates in each of the two; (ii) the candidate overlap between the two;
and (iii) that the two turn out to be quite similar.
an effect of having a successful political career, the reason being that the
latter two are not necessarily unbiased counterfactuals for the former. In
other words, since it is not random who are successful, one cannot know
what the income of the successful ones would have been had they not been
successful.
Figure 9: Disposable income among candidates borderline elected in 1991
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Note: The figure plots average disposable income among candidates borderline elected into a
municipal council in the 1991 election, separately by their future political careers. Local careers
are defined in the 2006–10 election period. National careers are defined in any election t + j
covered by the data. Income is measured in logs of 100 SEK deflated to 2000 year values.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
Thus, the pattern seen in Figure 9 does not conflict with the result from
Section 7 that monetary returns from politics are absent. Rather, this sec-
tion has shown a pattern indicating either that successful political careers
pay well, or that those with high earnings-potential have successful political
careers. The section has also shown that it is indeed possible to start out as
a borderline elected candidate and end up chairing the influential executive
board or being elected into the national parliament. Even though they are
not very frequent, these examples suggest that the results obtained in the pa-
per can likely be generalized to more prominent political figures, as opposed
to only pertaining to marginal, less visible politicians. Furthermore, what
can be deduced from the descriptives is that commitments spanning quite
long time periods seem necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) for climbing
the political career ladder.
10 Concluding remarks
By estimating causal effects of being elected in local elections on income
and political career prospects, this paper has looked for empirical evidence
of what types of payoffs that motivate politicians. I argue that local politics
is the relevant context for studying politicians’ motivations, since this is
where the majority of political careers start off.
Using a regression discontinuity design where the income of elected can-
didates who just barely won a seat ( the borderline elected ) is compared to
that of non-elected candidates who were close to winning a seat ( the bor-
derline defeated ), the paper has shown that monetary returns from politics
are absent. This seems to be true irrespective of whether one considers the
period right after the election, up to 15 years later or the period right after
exiting politics. It is also true on average as well as when considering hetero-
geneous effects across various dimensions of parties, councils and candidates.
Note, though, that this is not to say that there are no politicians making
money. In particular, those (relatively few) borderline elected candidates
who later had a successful political career indeed also had higher income.
As to the interpretation of this finding, however, with the current framework
it is not possible to distinguish between a positive causal effect on income
of having a successful political career and a selection effect (i.e., that those
with successful political careers are those with a high earnings-potential in
general).
Returns to politics can also be non-monetary, such as power, prestige
or reaching some ideological goal. Although very hard to measure as such,
these politics-specific payoffs are to a large extent encompassed by a candi-
date’s political career. Hence, the paper looked at whether—for exogenous
reasons—being elected in a local election improves future political career
prospects. A key, robust finding from this analysis is that being borderline
elected into a municipal council on average increases the probability of be-
ing nominated for the national parliament in subsequent elections by around
30%. Considering, instead, the treatment of actually having served in the
council, these results imply that the chances for nominations are almost
fully determined by municipal council experience. Another finding is that
being borderline elected into a municipal council also seems to increase the
chances of being elected in the next local election.
The result of no positive monetary returns from politics stands in con-
trast to findings from the few previous studies: Diermeier et al. (2005) find
that political experience increases earnings for US congressmen upon exiting
politics, and Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) estimate substantial effects on
wealth (at the time of death) for conservative politicians who were elected
into the British parliament with narrow vote margins. These contrasting
results can potentially be explained with their focus on national rather than
local politics. Another interesting potential explanation is the difference
in political institutions. Sweden is characterized by a typical multi-party,
proportional representation system where the parties are the main politi-
cal players. Therefore, it is sensible that monetary returns are larger in
countries like the US and Great Britain where the focus lies (more or less)
on individual politicians and where strong characters can make a career
rather quickly. In contrast and as shown here, in a party-dominant context
such as Sweden, it is indeed possible to start out as a marginal, borderline
elected candidate and end up chairing the influential executive board or be-
ing elected into the national parliament, but climbing the career ladder of
political parties takes time. Since such time investments do not seem to be
rewarded in monetary terms, investigating how this and other differences in
political institutions affect the selection of politicians is a very interesting
(but challenging) avenue for future research.
If time devoted to politics does not—for the vast majority—pay off fi-
nancially, then why is it—as shown by the data—so common for politicians
to stick around for so many election periods? It could be that they per-
ceive their chances of becoming a successful, well-paid politician to be high
enough to motivate them to continue. But given that the average probability
is very low, a more likely answer is that they are motivated by non-monetary
politics-specific payoffs such as actively taking part of the community and
striving towards some ideological goal.
This paper has shown that being elected once by chance (i.e., being
borderline elected) can be quite an effective starting point for enjoying such
payoffs. To conclude, a couple of real-life examples retrieved from the data
further illustrate this effect:
- A pair of male candidates aged around 40 and members of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party ran in 1991 for a seat in the local council in
a median-sized municipality (population around 15000) located in the
Stockholm metropolitan area. One was borderline elected, the other
was borderline defeated. The borderline defeated left politics—i.e., he
never ran again. The borderline elected continued to run in all local
elections up until 2006, and did so successfully except for in the 1994
election. He was also nominated for the national parliament in 2006,
where he was nine rank positions away from being elected. In the elec-
tion period 2006–10, he held a regular position in the executive board
and one additional working committee.
- A pair of female candidates aged around 40 and members of the Left
Party ran in 1991 for a seat in the local council in a small-sized,
northern municipality (population around 8000). One was borderline
elected, the other was borderline defeated. The borderline defeated
continued to run also in the 1994 and 1998 elections, but was not
elected then either. The borderline elected was further elected locally
in the 1994 and 1998 elections. She was also nominated to the na-
tional parliament in all subsequent elections up until 2006, when she
was finally elected.
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Determining the final ranking
This Appendix describes some of the complications in determining the order
in which candidates for a party with a given number of seats is elected—
i.e., how the ballot paper rankings translate into the final ranking. The full
procedure is stipulated in the Elections Act.
Starting with the 1998 election, voters can mark one preferred candidate
on the ballot paper (so-called preference voting). The top of the final ranking
is set based on the ranking of such preference votes, given that a candidate
has reached the preference vote threshold of 5% of the party’s votes in the
constituency, which must be at least 50 votes.
For candidates who do not reach the preference vote threshold (or for all
candidates prior to the 1998 election), comparison numbers are calculated
and ranked. The comparison numbers are calculated based on votes per
ballot paper and the so-called “whole-number method”. In the case of one
ballot paper per constituency, the ranking of comparison numbers simply
boils down to the party’s ballot paper ranking of candidates who did not
reach the preference vote threshold. These relatively simple cases constitute
around 90%. Matters become much more complex in the case of multiple
ballot papers per constituency, where comparison numbers and the asso-
ciated final ranking depend on a combination of the number of votes per
ballot paper and the number of ballot papers and how high each candidate
was ranked on the various ballot papers.
Additional complications in determining the final ranking arise when
candidates are sufficiently highly ranked in several constituencies (or for
several parties, although this rarely happens), for example as a consequence
of their party running with the same ballot paper in several constituencies.
This happens in around 30% of the cases. A candidate can only fill one
seat, which leaves the remaining seats to be assigned to someone else—a
procedure known as “double-election replacement”.
Finding the b orderline groups
When the final ranking is completely known, it is quite straightforward
to determine which candidates constitute the borderline groups. However,
not all data is in sufficient detail to allow for completely determining the
final ranking and hence, to find the borderline groups without making some
assumptions.
Due to the lack of ballot paper rankings, it is not possible to determine
any borderline groups in the 1994 election. Also the 1991, 1998 and 2002
election data is in different levels of detail—the later the election, the more
detailed the data.
For the 2002 election, data is sufficiently detailed to reproduce nearly the
exact final ranking. The exception is preference votes, where the information
is limited to whether or not a candidate reached the threshold but not by how
much, hindering ranking of such candidates and implying that identifying a
borderline elected is only possible when at least one candidate is elected via
comparison numbers. This also implies that the borderline elected is never
elected via preference votes but always via comparison numbers.
Determining the final ranking in the 2002 election by applying the rules
as stipulated in the Elections Act to the various combinations of ballot paper
rankings and ballot paper votes results in the error event that a candidate is
labeled as elected in a particular constituency when in fact he is not, or vice
versa, that amounts to 0.8%. The corresponding percentage at the council
level is as low as 0.03.48
For the 1991 and 1998 elections, some assumptions were needed about
the interdependence of ballot papers in the case of multiple-constituency
municipalities and/or constituency-overlapping ballot papers to identify the
borderline groups. Applying the assumptions used for the 1998 election to
the 2002 election results in about 90% identical borderline groups consisting
of the sets of three candidates with rank? = {−2,−1, 0}.
The majority of borderline groups are at the constituency level. However,
when a ballot paper overlaps several constituencies, the group is at the
municipality level. The reason is that it is hard to think of a candidate
as being borderline elected in some constituency if other candidates on the
same ballot paper were also elected, but in a different constituency. This
can happen as a consequence of the double-election replacement procedure.
Candidates with missing values on either of the control variables are
dropped in all estimations. Furthermore, only candidates from borderline
groups that have a borderline elected are included. Groups missing a border-
line elected mainly occur because the candidate is dropped due to missing
values on control variables, or because no candidate within the group was
elected via preference votes.
The final number of borderline elected candidates amounts to 1917, 1838
and 1837 from the 1991, 1998 and 2002 election, respectively. Because the
preference votes were only introduced in 1998 and as only candidates elected
via comparison numbers can be borderline elected, the 1991 number is some-
what larger. Figure 10 shows the corresponding number of candidates at
each rank? in the range −20 ≤ rank∗ ≤ 3, but summed over all three elec-
tions. The reason why the number of observations decreases to the left of the
borderline elected (at rank? = 0) is that some groups lack a sufficiently large
number of defeated candidates to assign low values of rank? to anyone.49
Analogously, the main reason why the number of observations decreases to
the right of the borderline elected is that many parties (and hence groups)
48These error events can be calculated using an indicator contained in the data for
whether or not a candidate was elected.
49Note that with the largest bandwidth used in the paper, the sample is restricted to
rank? ≥ −10.
only have a few seats in the council, so that being ranked several positions
higher than the borderline elected is not possible. Compared to the lack
of a sufficiently large number of defeated candidates, it is much more likely
that the lack of candidates ranked higher than the borderline elected that
follows from being a small party is systematically related to the outcome.
This is the rationale for estimating the direct effect of rank? using additional
defeated candidates rather than additional elected candidates.
Figure 10: Number of observations by rank from borderline elected
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Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
Descriptive statistics
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables for candidates in
the borderline groups with rank? = {−2,−1, 0}
Short run: 1–3 years/1 election later
mean std.dev min max obs
Average disposable income 1358.7 597.4 361.3 4059.3 16673
Run for municipal council 0.70 0.46 0 1 16754
Elected into municipal council 0.29 0.45 0 1 16754
Run for national parliament 0.11 0.32 0 1 16754
Medium run: 6–8 years/2 elections later
mean std.dev min max obs
Average disposable income 1477.7 736.5 377 5163.3 10915
Run for municipal council 0.51 0.50 0 1 11208
Elected into municipal council 0.20 0.40 0 1 11208
Run for national parliament 0.077 0.27 0 1 11208
Long run: 13–15 years/4 elections later
mean std.dev min max obs
Average disposable income 1764.1 925.6 436.3 6099 5283
Run for municipal council 0.31 0.46 0 1 5710
Elected into municipal council 0.11 0.31 0 1 5710
Run for national parliament 0.053 0.22 0 1 5710
Note: The sample for short-run outcomes includes borderline groups from the 1991, 1998
and 2002 elections, the sample for medium-run outcomes includes borderline groups from
the 1991 and 1998 elections and the sample for long-run outcomes includes borderline groups
from the 1991 election. Income is measured in 100 SEK deflated to 2000 year values (6.50
SEK≈1 USD), all other variables are indicator variables.
Source: Statistics Sweden & The Swedish Election Authority.
Placebo estimates
Table 12: Placebo estimates on the probability of being elected in future
elections to a municipal council
Election t+1 Election t+2 Election t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
electedplacebo 0.0196∗ 0.0264∗∗ 0.00949 0.0230∗ 0.0263 -0.0120
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0167) (0.0150)
rank? 0.0469∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0108 -0.0000506 0.0120
(0.00664) (0.00691) (0.00767) (0.00756) (0.00905) (0.00870)
Observations 16450 16085 10958 10633 5498 5268
Cut-off at rank?: -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The table reports placebo estimates of being elected into a municipal council on the probability
of being elected in the first (columns 1–2), second (columns 3–4) and fourth (columns 5–6) subsequent
election to a municipal council. All regressions include individual controls (cf. Table 4). Standard
errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Table 13: Placebo estimates on the probability of being nominated in future
elections to the national parliament
Election t+1 Election t+2 Election t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
electedplacebo 0.000257 0.000233 0.0151 -0.00791 0.0193∗ -0.00506
(0.00814) (0.00777) (0.0100) (0.00958) (0.0113) (0.0100)
rank? 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ -0.000325 0.00779 -0.000347 0.00451
(0.00477) (0.00441) (0.00554) (0.00538) (0.00617) (0.00549)
Observations 16450 16085 10958 10633 5498 5268
Cut-off at rank?: -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The table reports placebo estimates of being elected into a municipal council on the probability of
being nominated in the first (columns 1–2), second (columns 3–4) and fourth (columns 5–6) subsequent
election to the national parliament. All regressions include individual controls (cf. Table 7). Standard
errors clustered on municipality are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
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